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The 2008 merger between XM Radio and Sirius Radio showcased the
Federal Communication Commission's (FCC) authority to review proposed
mergers and acquisitions.' The FCC's merger review authority overlaps with
that of the Department of Justice (DOJ), as the Commission conducts its own
inquiry into the antitrust justification for the proposed merger-but with a
thumb on the scale against approval, requiring merging parties to prove
affirmatively that the merger is in the public interest.2 Justified by the FCC's
special expertise in the complex and evolving telecommunications sector,3 this
concurrent authority to conduct antitrust review has provoked critics to charge
that any economic benefits and public interest concessions that the FCC
obtains are outweighed by the costs of duplicative regulation.4 The absence of a
statutory time limit for the Commission's review threatens to drain
telecommunications mergers of their economic benefits.
1. See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio
Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion
and Order (Aug. 5, 20o8), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-o8-
178Al.pdf [hereinafter XM-Sirius Order]; Satellite Radio Firms' Merger Wins Approval From
FCC, WALL ST. J., July 26, 2008, at B5.
2. The public interest inquiry includes, among other factors, the impact of any merger on
competition under a markedly different standard than the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
The inquiry involves a holistic consideration of whether any benefits outweigh the
(presumed) anticompetitive harm of consolidation. See infra text accompanying note 19.
. See, e.g., James R. Weiss & Martin L. Stern, Serving Two Masters: The Dual Jurisdiction of the
FCC and the Justice Department over Telecommunications Transactions, 6 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 195, 206 (1998) ("The unique characteristics of the telecommunications
industry require a specialized agency to regulate competition.").
4. Id. at 205-06 (discussing the most common criticisms of dual agency review of
telecommunications mergers).
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This Comment suggests a judicial solution to the pitfalls of overlapping
antitrust review authority. The Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act of 1976 (HSR Act) provides a waiting period for the DOJ to complete its
review before firms above a certain size may consummate their merger. In
almost every industry context except FCC review, this deadline's expiration
permits firms to merge. The Communications Act of 1934 contains no such
provision, so merger review under its substantive authority impairs the
procedural impact of the HSR Act. If and when parties appeal FCC merger
approval orders to a federal court of appeals, conditions that the FCC adopts
after the DOJ statutory review deadline should be held unenforceable. By
applying the canon of construction that more recent and specific statutes
should govern over generally applicable statutes, holding post-deadline merger
conditions unenforceable would serve two central aims. First, it would relieve
the statutory tension inherent in having two procedural standards of
overlapping review authority, which undermines the HSR Act's goal of
expediting complex merger review.' Second, it would compel each agency to
conduct its analysis pursuant to its comparative advantage rather than to
duplicate efforts, while still allowing the FCC to weigh the unique factors that
impact the public interest.
I. TWO STANDARDS OF ANTITRUST REVIEW OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MERGERS
While the FCC's authority to review telecommunications mergers overlaps
with the DOJ's review authority, 6 the standards that each agency employs
differ both substantively and procedurally. Under section 7 of the Clayton Act,
the DOJ may prohibit any acquisition that may "substantially ... lessen
competition, or ... tend to create a monopoly."7 The HSR Act of 1976
established a formal preclearance mechanism for reviewing mergers that might
violate the Clayton Act.8 Its blanket coverage requires merger preclearance if
5. 122 CONG. REC. 30,877 (1976) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (noting that "the prospect of
protracted delays of many months" prompted Congress to remove an "automatic stay"
provision from the bill).
6. Though the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and DOJ possess concurrent authority to
review mergers under the Horizontal Guidelines generally, the FTC's authority does not
extend to telecommunications -it cannot review mergers of common carriers under the
Clayton Act. 15 U.S.C. § 21(a) (2000).
7. Id. § 18.
8. Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383
(codified at 1S U.S.C. § 18a).
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the newly merged commercial entity "would hold an aggregate total amount of
the voting securities and assets" greater than $200 million.9 One primary goal
of the Act was to overcome difficulties in "unscrambling" mergers that
occurred before the DOJ or FTC could undertake enforcement action - once
transactions were consummated and two companies combined, no effective
remedy would be available to undo the merger."
The HSR Act's preclearance process also ensures timely DOJ review of the
proposed merger. Notification of a proposed merger triggers a thirty-day
waiting period that allows the DOJ to determine whether the transaction may
be consummated. 1 If the DOJ takes no action by the end of the waiting period,
the parties may complete their transaction. 2 On the other hand, if the DOJ
decides to investigate further the competitive effects of the merger, it may
request additional information from the parties before the initial waiting
period expires. Upon receiving the requested information, which yields a large
volume of documents and testimony from the parties, the DOJ evaluates
whether the companies have "substantially complied" with its requests for full
documentary information. 3 A finding of substantial compliance triggers a new
thirty-day waiting period, in which the DOJ must complete its review.
14
Any DOJ challenge to a proposed merger requires the DOJ to bear the
burden of proving a violation of the antitrust laws.' This procedural posture is
crucial - mergers are presumed not to substantially lessen competition absent a
9. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(1).
1o. See Kathryn J. Sedo, Cooperative Mergers and Consolidations: A Consideration of the Legal and
Tax Issues, 63 N.D. L. REv. 377, 390 n.68 (1987).
M, 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b) (1) (B).
12. Id. § 18a(a), (b)(2).
13. Id. § 18a(e)(i)(B)(i)(II).
14. Id. § 18a(e); see Matthew S. Bailey, Note, The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: Needing a Second
Opinion About Second Requests, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 433, 443 (20o6). In practice, DOJ or FTC
review often extends beyond the initial thirty-day period, but the effect of agency failure to
seek further extensions remains: once the waiting period expires, the parties may
consummate the proposed merger. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a). If, during the review period, the DOJ
concludes that the merger will tend to "substantially lessen competition," it may file suit to
enjoin the merger. Id. §§ 18, 18a(f). Merging parties typically will reach settlement through
a consent decree with the Department rather than risk their transaction being permanently
enjoined. See Bailey, supra, at 443.
15. 15 U.S.C. § 18; United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975).
Importantly, the DOJ or FTC may still challenge a merger after the termination of this
waiting period, though the HSR Act's preclearance mechanism largely obviated the need for
post-merger review. See Scott A. Sher, Closed but Not Forgotten: Government Review of
Consummated Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 41 (2004).
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contrary showing. Against this backdrop, the DOJ's analysis of proposed
mergers results in a predictable standard that allows companies to forecast the
benefits of the merger, discounted by the probability of enforcement. Rather
than standing as an impediment, the traditional DOJ review process serves as a
loose filter for transactions that might substantially undercut competition.6
The FCC reviews potential mergers pursuant to its broad license transfer
authority under the Communications Act 7 to determine if the transactions
promote "the public interest, convenience and necessity."' 8 The public interest
standard is construed broadly-the Commission inquires into whether the
proposed license transfer might violate any provisions of the Communications
Act or "promise[] to yield affirmative public benefits." 9
The Commission's review roughly follows the informal adjudication model
used for new license applications;2 ° though it retains aspects of rulemaking-
parties seeking license transfer through merger often must submit supporting
materials, interested parties may offer their input through a notice-and-
comment process, and FCC staff may request additional documentation.2'
Unlike the DOJ review process, the FCC faces no statutory deadline for
completing its review and may request further public comment.' A self-
imposed 18o-day deadline for review23 is rarely followed, 4 "lead[ing] to long
delays that risk undermining the very reasons for a merger."2"
16. Announcement, Deborah Platt Majoras, Reforms to the Merger Review Process 1 (Feb. 16,
20o6), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2oo6/o2/mergerreviewprocess.pdf ("Each year, more than
95% of all HSR-reported transactions are 'cleared' during the initial 3o-day waiting period,
as the [DOJ or FTC] determines that the transaction is unlikely to lessen competition
substantially.").
17. See 4 7U.S.C. § 214, 31o. The FCC also has authority, under sections 7 and 11 of the Clayton
Act, to reject mergers of "common carriers engaged in wire or radio communication" under
the same standard as the DOJ. 15 U.S.C. §§ 18, 21(a). Due to the more restrictive scope of
inquiry, the FCC chooses not to exercise its merger review authority under the Clayton Act.
See infra text accompanying note 46.
'S. 47 U.S.C. § 31o(d).
ig. Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communications, Transferee, 14
F.C.C.R. 14,712, 14,737-38 (1999) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Ameritech-SBC Order].
20. See Weiss & Stern, supra note 3, at 197 n.23 ("Section 308 of the Communications Act ...
requires the Commission to consider the same factors in reviewing a license transfer as in
granting a license in the first place.").
21. See, e.g., Ameritech-SBC Order, supra note 19, at 14,733.
22. Id.
23. See Federal Communications Commission, Informal Timeline for Consideration of
Applications for Transfers or Assignments of Licenses or Authorizations Relating to
Complex Mergers, http://www.fcc.gov/transactiorVtimeline.html (last visited Apr. 24,
2009).
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The FCC may reach a binary decision on whether to approve a proposed
merger outright, or it may request concessions, which are conditions the
merging parties must meet to obtain approval.26 In these cases, merging parties
must either negotiate the conditions requested by the Comniission staff or risk
being subjected to a rare formal adjudicatory hearing whose prospective costs
are sufficiently high to deter any proposed merger. By agreeing to the
conditions, merging parties sacrifice most avenues for judicial review of the
final approval order.27
In determining the range and scope of conditions to seek from the merging
parties, the FCC conducts its own antitrust analysis that mimics steps "taken
directly from the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the Department of
Justice and the [Federal Trade Commission]," probing further into "potential
participants in each relevant market" than the DOJ's prospective competition
review.28 This broad antitrust analysis, which focuses on potential, rather than
existing, competition, is justified by the agency's industry expertise and
forecast of competitive conditions yet to ensue. 9 Courts have upheld the
agency's antitrust authority as necessary to be "weigh[ed] ... along with other
important public interest considerations. 30 -
In contrast with the DOJ's antitrust review standard, parties seeking FCC
merger approval carry a considerably higher burden of proof, under an
"amorphous" public interest analysis. 1 The parties must prove affirmatively
that the transaction would serve the public interest, or that "any likely
24. See Rachel E. Barkow & Peter W. Huber, A Tale of Two Agencies: A Comparative Analysis of
FCC and DOJ Review of Telecommunications Mergers, 2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 29, 31-32 ("The
average merger takes two to four months to conclude. Telecommunications mergers,
however, take between nine and twelve months to conclude.").
25. Id. at 33.
26. Id. at 64.
27. Id. at 78 (noting that the Commission's merger conditions are often "broad[] statements of
agency policy that evade judicial review").
28. Id. at 44-45 (internal quotation marks omitted).
29. See XM-Sirius Order, supra note 1, at 32.
30. United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72, 82 (D.C. Cir. 198o) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting N. Natural Gas Co. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 399 F.2d 953, 961 (D.C. Cit. 1968)).
31. Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed Institutional Design of U.S. Merger Review: Stacking the
Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. Rav. 159, 201 n.142 ("[T]he 'public interest'
evaluation tends to be more amorphous and wide-ranging than Section 7 (of the Clayton
Act].").
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anticompetitive effect is more than offset by other benefits."32 Through
negotiating for the procurement of these conditions, guided by the
commissioners' sense of whether procompetitive factors and other public
interest benefits outweigh any perceived costs of the merger, the FCC shapes
the transaction until the final form meets its approval.
Both the HSR Act and the 1996 Telecommunications Act sought to reduce
agency hindrances to private market transactions.3 The HSR Act specifically
allows for any merger to be consummated at the expiration of the statutory
waiting period.34 In adopting the Act, Congress sought to ensure effective
review in accordance with the antitrust laws, conducted in a timely manner.3"
The 1996 Telecommunications Act amended section 7 of the Clayton Act to
reaffirm that telecommunications mergers fall within the scope of the DOJ's
enforcement authority.s6 These statutes clarify that telecommunications
mergers are subject to dual jurisdiction, but they provide minimal guidance for
the FCC's procedural framework for merger review.
II. THE COSTS OF OVERLAPPING ANTITRUST REVIEW AUTHORITY
Many commentators hail the prospective public interest benefits that might
accrue from the merger review process, which allows the FCC to consider a
broader range of issues than DOJ or FTC review alone. 7 Despite the benefits
of specialized antitrust review by the FCC,38 its unbounded review procedure
32. Id. at 2O1; see XM-Sirius Order, supra note 1, at 19 ("[O]ur public interest authority enables
us to rely upon our extensive regulatory and enforcement experience to impose and enforce
conditions to ensure that a transaction will yield overall public interest benefits.").
33. The 1996 Act sought to "promote competition and reduce regulation... and encourage the
rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies." Telecommunications Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, pmbl., 11o Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
47 U.S.C.).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § i8a(a), (b)(2) (2000); 16 C.F.R. S 803.10 (2009).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(e)(B)(i)(iii) (requiring internal review by the FTC and the Assistant
Attorney General "to eliminate unnecessary burden, remove costly duplication, and
eliminate undue delay, in order to achieve a more effective and more efficient merger review
process").
36. Telecommunications Act S 6o1(b)( 3 ), 110 Stat. at 143.
37. See, e.g., Lili Levi, Reflections on the FCC's Recent Approach to Structural Regulation of the
Electronic Mass Media, 52 FED. COmm. L.J. 581 (2000). This Comment only briefly addresses
these extensive public interest benefits. I suggest that the FCC can better protect these
interests if it structures its merger review to avoid duplication of existing DOJ review.
38. The HSR Act inquires into whether the merged entity would be able to sustain a "small but
significant and nontransitory" increase in price over a short timespan. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE
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entails considerable costs to merging parties and the public. The costs of
overlapping antitrust review authority are readily apparent. Parties seeking to
merge must clear regulatory hurdles set at different heights -transactions that
clear the DOJ's well-advertised test39 might compel the FCC to attach broad-
ranging conditions.4° Merging companies have difficulty forecasting ex ante
the scope of the conditions that may be attached to the final merger approval.
The FCC furthers its regulatory agenda through the quasi-adjudicatory
proceeding involved in merger review, and its public interest standard offers
"virtually limitless discretion to approve, disapprove, or condition a merger
based on whatever factors it deems important at the time."4'
The delay in approving the transaction itself stands as another
unpredictable barrier to approval and consummation. Inconsistent review
deadlines-one agency with statutory deadlines for completion of review, one
without -render the agency with an unconstrained timeline dominant and the
statutory deadline meaningless in the context of dual review.42 Uncertainty
accompanying such delays raises the cost of financing transactions, which tacks
greater debts onto the ultimate merged entity and raises the opportunity costs
that each company faces. 43 AS the next Part argues, resolving this statutory
tension might reduce these costs while preserving the benefits of specialized
FCC review.
& FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORiZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § i.11, at 6 (1997 rev. ed.)
(hereinafter GUIDELINES]. This one-size-fits-all analysis is arguably insufficient for the
FCC's task of taking a "more expansive view of potential and future competition and its
impact on the relevant market." XM-Sirius Order, supra note i, at 19.
39. Under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, agencies first utilize the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index to calculate the impact of merger on the relevant product and geographic markets to
determine market concentration before and after the proposed merger. GUIDELINES, supra
note 38, at 15.
40. Barkow & Huber, supra note 24, at 54 ("Although DOJ gave the Bell Atlantic/NYNEX and
SBC/Ameritech mergers the green light with few or no strings attached, the Commission
required the companies to commit to a multitude of conditions.").
41. Id. at 41.
42. See Donald J. Russell & Sherri Lynn Wolson, Dual Antitrust Review of Telecommunications
Mergers by the Department of Justice and the Federal Communications Commission, 11 GEo.
MASON L. REV. 143, 151 (2002) ("[T]he FCC's practice of deferring final action until the
antitrust review has been completed has the practical effect of insulating DOJ from the
constraints imposed by the HSR Act.").
43. Investing excess cash flows in a merger or acquisition, by definition, limits other
opportunities either company might pursue in order to build share value. These opportunity
costs are likely to be sizable as companies seeking to merge must "defer investments or
important strategic decisions," Russell & Wolson, supra note 42, at iS1, which might place
them at a competitive disadvantage in an "industr[y] undergoing rapid economic and
technological change," Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 18o, 196 (1997).
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IllI.RELIEVING STATUTORY TENSION AND THE COSTS OF
OVERLAPPING AUTHORITY
Both the FCC and traditional antitrust enforcement agencies are tasked
with fulfilling similar goals - ensuring a competitive market and promoting the
public interest -but their overlapping authority threatens to undermine, these
objectives. Many critics contend that the FCC should jettison its duplicative
antitrust analysis from the public interest inquiry entirely, but courts have
upheld this mode of review. 4 This Comment argues, by comparison, that
courts can respond to this antitrust review overlap by encouraging more timely
consideration of telecommunications mergers.
On previous occasions, Congress has attempted unsuccessfully to impose
statutory limits on the FCC's merger review process, 4 but delayed merger
review already stands on a questionable legal basis. Instead of proceeding
under the Clayton Act, the FCC maintains that its "jurisdiction under the
Communications Act is sufficient to address all questions regarding the
competitive effects of the proposed transfer." 46 As a substantive matter, this
assertion is valid- sections 214(a) and 310(d) of the 1934 Communications Act
provide the public interest standard applicable to license transfers.47 As a
procedural matter, the Act provides little guidance, 48 so the FCC follows its
own self-prescribed process, which includes a nonbinding guideline of 18o
days for review. The HSR Act provides the default procedure for reviewing
large mergers, and its text is clear- telecommunications mergers do not fall
within one of its exceptions, and its conditions otherwise apply to mergers over
$200 million.49 Reading the Communications Act in conjunction with the
HSR Act, dual agency review proceeding under separate procedural
frameworks renders the statutory time limit substantively ineffective. The
statutory overlap thus permits an inefficient result-one underlying aspect of a
waiting period is that its expiration permits a transaction to ensue, but a
44. See United States v. FCC, 652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 198o).
45. See, e.g., Telecommunications Merger Review Act of2oo, H.R. 4019, lo6th Cong. (2090).:
46. Applications of AirTouch Communications, Inc. Transferor, and Vodafone Group, PLC.
Transferee, for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses and Authorizations;
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 9430, 9434 n.21 (1999).
47. 47 U.S.C. §§ 214(a), 31o(d) (2000).
48. Section 31o(d) of the Communications Act provides that license transfers are governed by
the standard applicable to granting new licenses. 47 U.S.C. § 31o(d). The relevant section
provides no time limit on the FCC's review period. Id. § 308.
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a.
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concurrent review proceeding faces no time restriction and can delay a
transaction indefinitely.
Scholars have pointed out the limits on judicial review as a central
drawback to the FCC's process of exacting "voluntary" conditions."0 When
telecommunications firms can merge only after final Commission approval,
which often requires adopting negotiated conditions, the newly merged
company cannot challenge the very provisions to which it consented. Some
scholars have gone so far as to argue that this drawback "will persist unless the
Communications Act is amended to provide a mechanism for timely judicial
review.""1 To the extent that parties wish to challenge the substance of the
FCC's orders under the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) "arbitrary and
capricious" standard, 2 this concern is valid. Judicial deference to agency
decisions leaves little room for parties to object when they granted their
consent. The FCC's underlying procedure stands on weaker authority. 3
Congress has not spoken explicitly on the duration of the FCC's public interest
review under the Communications Act, nor have parties applying for merger
approval consented to any timeline (or lack thereof). Judicial review of final
FCC orders may be available to challenge the basis for its unimpeded duration
if the agency's action is final, with binding legal consequences. s4
If the FCC's procedural flexibility accompanies its substantive review
authority, then it directly undercuts the HSR Act's deadline. Courts can
remedy this conflict by applying the canon of construction that when two
statutes conflict, the specific statute governs over the general-that is, "a
specific policy embodied in a later federal statute should control [the courts']
construction of the [earlier] statute, even though it ha[s] not been expressly
So. See, e.g., Barkow & Huber, supra note 24, at 69 ("The option of 'voluntary conditions' is
especially likely to shield the agencies [sic] policies from judicial review. That is, the
imposition of policies via conditions on a particular merger is unlikely to get to the judicial
review stage because the parties themselves are frequently in no position to challenge the
Commission's order.").
51. Russell & Wolson, supra note 42, at 154.
52. See 5 U.S.C. § 7o6(2)(A).
53. Cf. SBC Commc'ns Inc. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 1484, 1496-97 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (upholding the
FCC's "procedural discretion in implementing the Communications Act" and resisting the
appellants' challenge to merger review procedures as requiring an "unwarranted intrusion
into the agency's ability to conduct its own business").
54- Cf. Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 269 F.3d 1o98, 1103 (D.C. Cir. 2001) ("As a general
proposition, an FCC order is final if it (i) represents a terminal, complete resolution of the
case before the agency, and (2) determines rights or obligations, or has some legal
consequence." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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amended.""5 The Supreme Court has applied this canon quite deliberately,
holding that "[w]here there is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute
will not be controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the priority of
enactment. '', 6 Though the HSR Act is not the organic statute governing FCC
merger review, an unbounded FCC review period nullifies the Act's statutory
deadline. Applying this canon of construction would separate the FCC's
substantive review authority from its unbounded procedure, allowing the HSR
Act's procedural provisions to apply across the board. Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council,17 lower courts have been hesitant to impose on agencies
additional procedural duties besides those contained in the APA. The scope of
this deference to agency procedural choices is limited, however, to the extent
that procedures may be anchored in statutory text. 8 Imposing this procedural
restriction would breathe life into the HSR Act's statutory deadline in the
context of telecommunications mergers.
In applying this canon, courts should treat merger conditions attached by
the FCC after the expiration of the HSR Act's waiting period as unenforceable,
construing the more recent and specific statutory provision as binding on the
review of all mergers. s9 Courts can mitigate the costs of delay by enforcing the
HSR Act's deadline on the Commission itself. Imposing a strict statutory
deadline on the FCC's merger review process would resolve the inherent
tension between the two statutes and would limit the FCC's bargaining power
during the course of negotiating merger conditions. Enforcing this procedural
rule as binding on FCC review might disrupt the Commission's ability to
promulgate policy through license transfer orders, but it would strongly
encourage Congress to clarify this statutory gray area. Absent congressional
action, establishing a time limit for FCC review might reduce the agency's
incentive to engage in duplicative antitrust review. Instead, given that the DOJ
55. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 143 (2000) (second and third
alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Estate of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 530-31
(1998)).
56. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 445 (1987) (quoting Radzanower v.
Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)).
57. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
58. See, e.g., Am. Radio Relay League, Inc. v. FCC, 524 F.3d 227, 239 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
59. The D.C. Circuit in SBC Communications Inc. v. FCC upheld the FCC's procedural
discretion in reviewing mergers. 56 F.3d 1484, 1496 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citing Vermont Yankee,
435 U.S. at 549). The appellants' challenge, however, focused on the FCC's method of
review, not its duration. The judicial solution this Comment advocates would leave the
FCC's discretion over mode of procedure intact, but would impose a limit that preserves the
HSR Act's statutory deadline.
158o
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conducts its own thorough antitrust analysis, the FCC would have greater
incentive to focus on its institutional strengths: issuing orders and negotiating
conditions based on unique public interest considerations.
One might counter, however, that Congress's repeated attempts to limit
the FCC's procedural discretion 6o suggest legislative acquiescence through its
failure to overturn the agency's interpretation of its enabling text".6 The
Supreme Court often has held that failures to pass legislation to override
agency or judicial interpretations of ambiguous statutory text amount to
acquiescence.62 In the FCC merger review context, Congress has taken notice
of the costs of dual review, but the flurry of statutory amendments that failed
to gain traction may suggest that the FCC's procedural framework should
remain intact, or at least should not be judicially curtailed. Yet the acquiescence
counterargument stands on flimsy grounds. Unlike recent cases in which the
Court found that private-party reliance on longstanding agency interpretations
counseled against judicial second-guessing, 6' FCC review procedure itself
imposes costs on regulated parties. Extending the HSR Act's time limit to FCC
review would not pose new reliance costs, unless reduced flexibility prompts
the Commission to reject proposed mergers with greater frequency.
Acquiescence, in this context, is less than explicit: Congress has not ratified the
FCC's procedure by reenacting the Communications Act, 64 and, arguably, the
HSR Act's broad sweep suggests a more recent intent to limit agency
impediments to proposed mergers.
This statutory construction may raise broader concerns, as the FCC's
mandate to consider the public interest extends beyond antitrust analysis, and
60. See Jim Chen, The Echoes of Forgotten Foofalls: Telecommunications Mergers at the Dawn of the
Digital Millenium, 43 Hous. L. REV. 1311, 1337 n.172 (2007) (recounting multiple legislative
attempts to curb the FCC's merger review authority).
61. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 6ol (1983) (finding that Congress's
failure to act on proposed bills seeking to overturn an IRS ruling "provide[d] added support
for concluding that Congress acquiesced" to the agency's interpretation).
62. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 804 n.4 (1998).
63. See, e.g., Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 17 n.9 (2007); see also William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of
Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEo. L.J. 1O83, 1188 (2008)
("[A] longstanding agency interpretation that regulated parties have internalized and that
Congress has acquiesced in should rarely be overturned ....").
64. The broad reach of the 1996 Telecommunications Act overhauled a number of provisions of
the original 1934 Communications Act. Even defining "ratification" loosely, this subsequent
statute only spoke to merger review by clarifying that the Clayton Act, and thus the DOJ's
review authority, applies to telecommunications mergers. See supra note 36 and
accompanying text. Arguing that this amendment ratified the FCC's procedure is tenuous,
because this provision ensures that the DOJ's procedural framework accompanies its review.
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this remedy could undercut important conditions attached to merger orders.
This concern, though well founded, can be narrowed by considering the scope
of the Commission's review. The FCC's public interest inquiry has focused
extensively on antitrust concerns, 65 requiring few conditions unrelated to
competition within the telecommunications market. Strong incentives to
complete its review and decision on the same timeframe as the DOJ-lest the
final conditions be rendered unenforceable -would compel the FCC to avoid
duplicative analysis and focus primarily on factors not considered by the
Department. Acting concurrently under similar deadlines, each agency would
focus on its comparative advantage in protecting the public interest.
Interpreting the 1996 Telecommunications Act provides further support
for a standard that undermines unlimited FCC merger review. The 1996 Act
clarified that DOJ review of telecommunications mergers should complement
the FCC's review.66 If the DOJ's threshold for merger preclearance is lower
than the FCC's -as is evident from the standards each agency employs -
allowing DOJ review in addition to FCC review seems superfluous. Construing
the HSR Act's deadline as applicable to both agencies' procedures might allow
this overlap to serve the 1996 Act's two central goals: enhancing efficiency and




The tension between the two statutory standards for merger review
procedure deserves greater notice. This Comment advocates a judicial remedy,
though the optimal solution would be legislation providing greater clarity to
how the FCC should conduct its review of telecommunications mergers.
Where Congress did not account for the supremacy of the FCC's unlimited
review power, construing the more precise statutory provision to limit the
length of the FCC's review would result in one of two effects: (1) Congress
would clarify that, in the context of dual antitrust review by multiple agencies,
the statutory time limit should be obviated in order for the FCC to complete its
more broad-ranging review, or (2) the FCC would be forced to restrict its
65. See Applications of NYNEX Corp., Transferor, and Bell Atlantic Corp., Transferee, for
Consent To Transfer Control of NYNEX Corp. and Its Subsidiaries, Memorandum Opinion
and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 19,985, 19,987 (1997).
66. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
67. 47 U.S.C. § 257(b) (2000) (affirming the FCC's national policy of encouraging "vigorous




OPTIMIZING DUAL AGENCY REVIEW OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS MERGERS
inquiry to nonduplicative analysis in order to maximize its efficacy in attaching
merger conditions that benefit the public interest.
WILLIAM J. RINNER
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